INTRODUCTION
The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which is pending before the US Congress, would deeply change labor relations and has the potential to fundamentally alter the landscape of the US economy. As currently drafted, the legislation contains two major provisions, the first of which would provide for union representation when an employee majority has signed union authorization cards and the second of which calls for a system of mandatory arbitration if a collective bargaining agreement is not reached approximately 130 days after a union is newly certified. In addition, the legislation would increase penalties against employers for certain unfair labor practices.
1. THE CARD CHECK. Under EFCA, a union must be certified as a representative of a bargaining unit by the federal National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and recognized by an employer if a majority of employees sign valid authorization cards.
This proposal would eliminate the right employers have under current law to refrain from recognizing a union unless it demonstrates the existence of majority employee support in an election by secret ballot. EFCA does not establish any guidelines or procedures for collecting the authorization cards from workers or for verifying their validity, but specifies that the Board shall develop such rules.
MANDATORY INTEREST ARBITRATION. Under EFCA, after any union is newly
certified, the parties must commence bargaining within ten days after the employer receives a written bargaining request from any newly-certified union. Thereafter, if the union and employer fail to reach an initial agreement within 90 days after bargaining commences, an additional 30-day period is added for mediation after either party requests mediation by notifying the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) . If an agreement is not reached during this 30-day period, EFCA requires arbitration, resulting in a decision made by the arbiter(s) that would be binding for two years. Each of these periods is subject to extension by mutual agreement. EFCA provides no opportunity for employee ratification of the arbitrator-imposed terms and conditions, in contrast to the normal employee review and ratification process that typically takes place when conventional labor contracts are tentatively agreed upon by labor and management. Nor does EFCA articulate any time limit by which the arbitral panel must issue its decree, the standards governing the scope of any arbitrator-imposed terms and conditions, the subjects that may or may not be incorporated into any arbitration decision, the standards governing any appeal from arbitration, or how the "arbitration board" shall be selected. (The FMCS is charged with developing regulations governing the referral of disputes to arbitration.) 3. INCREASED PENALTIES. Finally, EFCA would result in the award of triple back pay, plus civil penalties up to $20,000 per violation, for certain employer unfair labor practices committed during a union organizing effort or during negotiations on an initial contract. In addition, the NLRB would be required to seek an injunction against certain alleged unfair labor practices involving union organizing or initial contract disputes. EFCA contains no corresponding provisions pertaining to unions' unfair labor practices during union organizing or initial contract disputes.
Proponents of EFCA provide a variety of arguments as to why the US workforce needs these provisions, especially those pertaining to card checks and arbitrator-imposed initial two-year "contracts." In this paper, I critically assess the arguments for EFCA as well as the unintended consequences it likely will generate, should it be passed. In Section 2, I discuss the impact the proposed legislation would have on the economy at large, based on the empirical literature regarding the impact of unions on certain important economic variables. Section 3 provides the key contributions of the paper. It begins with a review of the Canadian experience with card check and first contract arbitration rules, which are set at the Province level and have changed several times for political reasons over the past few decades. Because Canada offers a natural experiment for quantitative analysis, an empirical study of the relationship between union formation rules and unemployment based on Canadian data provides a window on the most likely effects of passing EFCA in the United States. Section 4 offers my conclusions.
I find that, while card check union certification backed by mandatory two-year "contract" arbitration could be expected to increase union membership as hoped by EFCA proponents, EFCA is unlikely to achieve its main goal of improving social welfare, which should take into account possible consequences not only for union members but for all other individuals, because the proposed rules would likely have detrimental effects on the unemployment rate and job creation. These are two adverse effects that America can ill afford at any time, but especially at this time of recession.
The empirical analysis presented in Section 3 provides the quantitative support for this claim. Starting from the finding in the literature that card check systems do lead to an increase in union density in comparison to an election system, I demonstrate empirically that an increase in union density this year would lead to an increase in the unemployment rate and a drop in the job creation rate in the following year. These results are statistically significant and robust to a number of model specification changes. I believe these results would, if anything, be more significant in America given that the card check system here would be paired with mandatory interest arbitration that removes the initial contract from the parties' control. I conclude, as a result, that the costs of passing EFCA as currently designed would outweigh any benefit, even if I ignore the costs of transition and administration which properly belong in any social calculus. Specifically, my analysis predicts that passing EFCA would lead to a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate for every 3 percentage points gained in union membership brought about by a system of card checks and mandatory arbitration.
Supporters of EFCA present three primary arguments as to why the Congress should pass the legislation. First and foremost, advocates claim that the NLRA is not working effectively, which requires the enactment of EFCA to make it easier for unions to organize workers, and which ostensibly will reverse the long decline in unionization.
1 Second, they posit that EFCA is needed to reduce the number of employer unfair labor practices (ULPs) which, according to EFCA's proponents, are primarily responsible for the current low levels of private sector union representation.
2 Finally, proponents argue that, under EFCA, more union and nonunion workers will gain access to better health care, increased wages, and a generally better standard of living, thus improving social welfare.
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Before proceeding with the substantive analysis set forth in Sections 2 and 3, it is relevant to point out that existing research -including some studies otherwise favored by unions -appear to contradict the above arguments in support of EFCA.
(i) The Decline in Union Membership. As the chart below clearly shows, the percentage of the private sector US workforce that is unionized has declined steadily from a high of over 35% in the mid-1950's to just over 8% today. 1929 1936 1943 1950 1957 1964 1971 1978 1985 1992 1999 EFCA supporters contend that the unions' steady decline in the US is the result of employer misconduct that has been improperly permitted under US labor law. Yet, the levels of unionized workers have declined everywhere in developed economies, regardless of the labor law regime in effect. For example, Visser analyzed data from 14 developed countries and concludes that private sector unionization across all countries has been strongly declining since the 1970s. 4 A key factor in this trend has been the declining employment in heavily unionized industries -e.g., the US auto industrywhich obviously has contributed to enormous decreases in union membership. , 2004) . Bronfenbrenner and Hickey conclude that for each additional tactic used by employers, such as hiring management consultants or using paid or free media to argue against unionization during an election, the probability of a union victory decreases by 13%, while for every union tactic, such as strategic targeting 9 and escalating pressure tactics in the workplace, 9 the probability of a union victory increases by 34%. On average, the authors find that employers use about 7.2 tactics per election while unions use 2.6 tactics, which implies that overall union and employer tactics tend to cancel each other out. These findings are especially interesting because the Bronfenbrenner and Hickey study reflects a bias in favor of unions and is not constructed in a way that is as objective as would normally be desired. For instance, the authors base their results mainly on a survey of lead organizers for some 412 elections with 50 or more eligible voters. In compiling their data on employer and union tactics Bronfenbrenner and Hickey seem to rely exclusively on the responses of the lead organizers, which ignore the views of other participants and could offer a potentially biased view of the events. 10 Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, supra note 9, at 54. 11 Many people dispute the claims raised by EFCA proponents concerning alleged employer unfair labor practices, and the alleged inadequacy of existing law to effectively adjudicate and remedy any such unfair labor practices. employee welfare. To get a complete picture of employee welfare, we need to examine not just the direct impact of unions on wages and benefits for some workers at a given point in time, but also on the indirect effects over time of all workers-a topic I cover in the next section.
POTENTIAL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF EFCA
As just discussed, proponents of EFCA point to evidence that unions raise wages and improve benefits for the workers they represent. At a broader level, unions also affect wage differentials and distribution across workers and across industries; they can affect firm level employment growth, and under some circumstances can even affect a firm's incentives to invest in research and development (R&D). Broader still, unions can impact unemployment levels, output growth, and investment. All of these effects, both today and tomorrow, need to be considered before we can answer the social benefit and welfare questions regarding passage of EFCA. In this section I therefore present a brief review of the empirical literature on how unions affect the economy.
The most immediate benefit workers can expect from joining a union is higher wages.
Blanchflower, in a survey of US studies on wage differentials, concludes that union members earn on average about 15% more that their nonunion counterparts. differential between industries, between firms in the same industry, and also between workers within a firm.
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Not surprisingly, there is a cost to higher union wages. First, employers' profits tend to be lower. Karier concludes that for monopoly firms, a union's share of profits might be as high as 47%. 18 The cost, however, reaches well beyond what employers pay in higher wages. As firms must spend more for their unionized workforce, they tend to cut back in other areas. In particular, the overall cost of higher union wages can lead to fewer unionized positions. This process could arise by a shift of work patterns within unionized firms, or by having nonunionized firms achieve higher market shares. As a result, cutting unionized jobs directly impacts employment growth within unionized firms.
In the mid 1990s a number of studies considered the employment growth difference between unionized and nonunionized firms. successful. 23 While there is consensus on the decline in hours, a 1992 survey by Belman of 17 studies in the literature reaches no robust conclusion on whether the productivity level (that is, output for a given hour worked) is higher or lower for unionized shops as compared to non-unionized shops.
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Turning from firm-specific effects to broader macro-economic effects, I consider the empirical studies that have analyzed unemployment, labor supply, and investment. Many of these studies are based on a single cross-section of data for highly diverse OECD countries at a given point in time. 25 This quantitative approach creates a number of issues. For example, one or two outliers (that is, nations with atypical experiences) can alter the results substantially. More fundamentally, a single cross-section of data does not allow researchers to carefully control for unobserved country-specific factors, such as historical or institutional issues, that may play an important role in shaping the analysis.
Another problem with the cross sectional studies is that many of them do not attempt to control for the fact that some institutional arrangements in the labor market may be endogenous. For example, cross sectional analysis cannot clearly determine whether high unemployment is a consequence or a cause of high union density, in the sense that workers may have higher incentives to seek union protection as a means of reducing layoffs when unemployment levels are high.
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With these caveats in mind, an early paper by Rees finds that employers' reallocation of labor, from union sectors to nonunion sectors, in turn leads to deadweight losses in the gross domestic product (GDP). 27 In other words, as union labor becomes more expensive and firms substitute away from it, the result can be an increase in allocative inefficiencies that in turn lowers national production. However, as Keefe points out, these characteristics may be independent of union status.
In contrast, unionized firms tend to invest less on capital and R&D than nonunionized firms, likely because they have fewer resources to devote to such investments due to the reduced profits noted above. Acs and Audretsch, Connolly et al., and other scholars, conclude that unionization reduces spending on R&D. 32 Hirsch concludes that nonunion firms invest roughly 10% more that union firms. 33 At the firm level, Connolly et al. find that higher unionization reduces the return to R&D and thereby reduces firms' investment in R&D. 34 Because R&D is a pivotal input in the innovation process, with less invested in R&D unionized firms can be expected to contribute less to advancing technology.
In their study of the impact of unions on general capital investment, Odgers and Betts
analyze a panel dataset of 18 Canadian industries over a twenty-year period to determine the impact of union density on the net investment rate controlling for a number of factors including the fraction of days lost to strikes, changes in output, and the user cost of capital. 35 They conclude that the presence of unions appears to reduce investment when the percentage of unionized firms in the industry is between zero and about 50 percent, but the effect plateaus above this level. points, a result that is supported by Nickell and Layard as well as by Jackman. 41 The OECD study also concludes that inflation and real earnings growth both increase as a result of higher bargaining coverage.
Nickell provides analysis that moves beyond the single-cross section approach by using two cross-sections periods for 20 OECD countries, one for 1983-88 and another for 1989-94. 42 He studies the impact of a number of labor measures, including union density and a union coverage index, on unemployment and labor supply. In his model, 43 Nickell controls for the degree of employment protection, 44 the percent of employment income that unemployment benefits replace, the duration of unemployment benefits, a measure of active labor market policies, a measure of bargaining coordination between unions and employers, and the total tax rate on labor. The only control that Nickell includes in his analysis to account for macro-economic differences across countries, however, is the annual change in the inflation rate. Nickell finds that greater union density, and especially higher union coverage, tends to raise unemployment, although this effect is mitigated when unions and employers can coordinate their bargaining activities. 45 The effect of union density on the supply of labor (measured as the ratio of employment to population)
is less clear-all the coefficients on union density have a negative sign but most of them are not statistically significant. PERSPECTIVES 55 (1997) . 43 The model includes random effects. 44 The employment protection index (between 1and 20) is based on the strength of the country's legislation regarding hiring and firing employees. 45 Coordination is a measure of the wage bargaining structure, e.g. whether wages are bargained at a national or industry level. studies in the literature therefore suggest, but in all likelihood underestimate, negative unintended consequences from passing EFCA.
The costs should be carefully weighed against any purported benefits of passing the Act, all of which appear to benefit some groups at the expense of others. There is no coherent theoretical argument that explains how the higher costs, greater legal uncertainty, and expanded government intervention entailed in EFCA would improve overall social welfare. Thus the existing literature is informative and provocative, but it is not specific enough to define the full impact of passing EFCA. In order to examine that issue in more detail I turn next to studies on the Canadian experience, which have particular relevance to EFCA.
THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
The Canadian labor legislation experience offers an extraordinarily rich field for evaluating the potential impact of EFCA on the US labor force and economy for two reasons. First, for the last three decades union certification procedures in Canada have undergone significant changes over time and across provinces, driven by political considerations rather than economic ones. As a result, Canada provides excellent data with which to measure the potential economic consequences of the key proposed changes in EFCA. Second, the remarkable similarities in industrial structure and the economic integration between the US and Canada allow us to use the Canadian experience as natural experiment for the US economy.
Unlike the United States where labor law is determined at the federal level, most employers in Canada are regulated by provincial labor legislation. In Canada, industries subject to federal regulation include employees of the federal government, airlines, interprovincial transportation, banking, telecommunications, grain production, fisheries and uranium processing, while all others are regulated at the provincial level 46 . Until 1976 all 46 One might be concerned that estimating the effect of unions on macroeconomic factors may be biased by the presence of federally regulated industries within provinces. In particular, the federally regulated unions in Canada all switched to allow for first contract arbitration in 1978; this was the only change that occurred during the period of analysis. Because the results in this paper are driven by changes in union density over time and across provinces, the only way for the federally regulated unions to affect the findings would be for some bias in the change in variables from 1978 -1979 Similarly, Slinn showed that Ontario's switch from card checks to mandatory voting in 1995 produced a significant drop in the success of union certification.
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What is clear from these studies is that a card check system brings a higher success rate for unionization and thereby results in higher levels of union density. In fact, Johnson has suggested that between 17% and 24% of the difference in union density between the United States and Canada can be explained by the fact that mandatory voting is more differences would create a substantial bias. Moreover, to the extent that the federal change did not affect union density, but did affect other variables included, then the year fixed effect for that one year included in the models here should be sufficient to capture the change. I therefore conclude that bias from the federally regulated unions, if any, would be de minimus. 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7 Year
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Along with the frequent changes in provincial certification procedures, the requirement of first contract arbitration has also varied by province over time. By 1994, seven provinces had introduced first agreement arbitration that applied to all negotiation efforts.
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The high degree of variation and the fact that the changes in unionization policy were dictated by changes in political party influence 54 mean that Canadian data offer a natural α is an unobservable, province-specific, time-invariant factor that may have an impact on the unemployment rate in that province, t γ is a time-specific, province-invariant factor that may have an impact on the unemployment rate in all provinces, is a vector of lagged, observable, province-specific factors that may help shape the unemployment rate in each province and time period (described below), and
ε is a province-and timespecific error term. The parameter δ and the vector β are the parameters to be estimated, and the focus is onδ , as capturing the effect of union density on unemployment. 61 Detailed descriptions of variables are included in the Appendix.
The analysis begins with a base regression of unemployment on union density and then replaces union density with lagged union density to avoid simultaneity problems.
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To this basic specification a number of controls are introduced: time fixed effects, output, lagged output (denoted by a 1 or a 2 in the table below), the first difference of output (denoted by an fd in the table below), lags of the first difference of output, and a lag of the inflation rate. It is this final and most complete specification with the full set of controls that Table 3 The results as shown in Table 3 are quite consistent across all specifications: higher union density today is associated with higher unemployment tomorrow and the effect is highly statistically significant under each estimation method. For example, looking at the first row, a one percentage point increase in lagged union density raises the unemployment rate by 0.30 percentage points (pooled OLS) or 0.35 percentage points (fixed effects). 65 To put this effect into perspective, raising union density today by one standard deviation (7.28 percentage points) would raise the unemployment rate next year 62 That is, to capture a causal relationship between union density and unemployment, as opposed to a simple correlation. 63 The results for the other specifications are presented in the Appendix. 64 Because I analyze a time series panel dataset, I correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by employing Newey-West standard error correction for OLS and fixed effects models and by correcting for intra-group correlation in random effects models. I use these error term corrections in all reported regressions. 65 I tested numerous specifications, varying the controls included in the regression. While the precise effect of union density on unemployment varies by specification (within a range of 0.21 to 0.39%), all of the estimated effects are positive and statistically significant. Following the model developed in Nickell, supra note 42, I also tested the effects of lagged union density on the log of the unemployment rate. This estimation revealed qualitatively similar results thereby adding further stability and robustness to the relationship between union density and unemployment developed above. The results of models explaining log unemployment are included in the Appendix.
by about 2.20 percentage points (i.e., 7.28 x 0.30). This is a substantial effect considering that, in the full Canadian panel, the median unemployment rate is 10.10, the 25th-percentile rate is 7.75 and the 75 th -percentile rate is 12.95.
On the basis of these results, I conclude that a card check system which increases union membership would also lead to a considerably higher unemployment rate.
Translating these results to the US, in order to determine how much the US percent (the Carter and Lotke prediction), in the following year the US unemployment rate would increase by 2.97 to 3.53 percentage points over current levels -an increase of 4.56 million to 5.42 million unemployed workers. Predicted increases in the unemployment rate are progressively higher should the passage of EFCA lead to union densities equivalent to prior decades.
If the passage of EFCA were to increase union membership by 1.5 million each year for the next 10 years (the Stern prediction), then unemployment is predicted to rise by between 5.3 and 6.2 million, with union density settling at just under 23% in 2018.
Assuming all other factors remain constant, the effect of this increase in union membership would be to raise the unemployment rate by between 8.6 and 9.2% by 2018.
iv) Results: Unions and the Employment Rate
In the second set of regressions, I consider whether union rule changes have an impact on the employment rate.
71 Specifically, I study the impact of union density, increasing as a result of moving to a card check system or contract arbitration, on the fraction of the population that is employed. 72 For this I estimate equation (2) η is a province-and time-specific error term. λ and the vector θ are the parameters to be estimated, with λ providing the estimated effect of union density on the employment rate. 70 See the Table 9 in the appendix for details on this computation. 71 Note that the unemployment rate measures the percentage of workers who consider themselves in the labor force who are actively seeking work. The employment rate, on the other hand, captures the percentage of all people in a given area who are employed. Thus, the denominator for the employment rate includes those in the labor force (employed and unemployed) plus those out of the labor force (such as retired persons, stay-at-home parents, and adult students). 72 This approach follows Nickell, supra note 42.
Just as with the unemployment analysis, a number of variations on equation (2) are estimated, starting with a base regression of the employment to population ratio on union density. Union density is then replaced with lagged union density, fixed time effects are added, as are controls for the output to population ratio, the lagged output to population ratio, the first difference of the output to population ratio, and lags of the first difference of the output to population ratio. The model is again estimated by OLS, random effects, and fixed effects. Notes: All three models were estimated with time fixed effects, while the FE model was estimated with province fixed effects in addition to time fixed effects. * Indicates significance at the 95% level; ** Indicates significance at the 99% level.
In all cases presented in Table 4 , the coefficient on lagged union density (row one) is negative and highly statistically significant. 73 An increase of one percentage point in lagged union density reduces the employment to population ratio by about 0.23 percentage points (OLS) or by 0.17 percentage points (fixed effects). 74 Thus, if EFCA were to raise the union density today by 5 percentage points, the employment rate would decrease by 0.86 to 1.14 percentage points next year, for a net loss of between 0.55 and 0.95 million jobs. If EFCA were to raise the union density today by 10 percentage points, the employment rate would decrease by 1.72 to 2.27 percentage points next year, for a net loss of between 1.81 and 2.61 million jobs.
In order to gauge the full impact of the decline in the employment rate on the economy, I estimate a number of regressions of Canadian provincial output on the lagged 73 The only specifications in which this was not the case occurred when I ran random and fixed effects regressions of EMP_POP on union density and lagged union density respectively without any additional controls. 74 The effect of lagged union density on the employment to population ratio varied from +0.22% to -0.45% across all models tested. Out of 21 models, 17 produce negative and significant coefficients for lagged union density and only two of the equations give positive significant coefficients. All models with time fixed effects, time and province fixed effects, and pooled OLS produce significant and negative effects of lagged union density on employment to population ratio.
employment to population ratio (results presented in an appendix). For example, in a fixed-effects model of log output on the lagged employment-population ratio plus time fixed effects and the lagged capital stock, a decline in the employment rate of one percentage point is associated with a statistically significant decline of nominal output of 1.5 percentage points tomorrow. The decline is statistically significant and varies from 1.5 to 5.9 percentage points for a one percentage point drop in employment rate (per the pooled OLS model). This effect is considerably larger than the Freeman and Medoff output effect of 0.40 percentage points reported above.
I conclude on the basis of these results that a card check and mandatory contract arbitration system which raise union membership -such as those detailed in EFCA are expected to do -would lead to a reduction in the US employment rate and a subsequent reduction in US industry output. Just as with the unemployment rate estimates reported above, predicted decreases in the employment rate get progressively higher for larger gains in union membership.
v) Results: Unions and Investment
As a final test of the impact of moving to a card check system on the economy, I
consider investment. Specifically, I analyze the impact of union density on the net investment rate, defined as gross investment minus depreciation as a fraction of the capital stock. For this I estimate equation (3) (1) and (2), and , i t ψ is a province-and time-specific error term. Here, μ and the vector σ are the parameters to be estimated and the focus is on μ , as the estimated effect of union density on the net investment rate.
I follow the same approach as before, starting with a simple regression of the net investment rate on union density, then replacing contemporaneous union density with lagged union density, and finally including time fixed effects. In addition, similar to Odgers and Betts, I estimate a model of the net investment rate on lagged union density, lagged union density squared (to capture any nonlinearities in the relationship), the lags of the first difference of output (normalized by the net capital stock), and fixed time effects. Recall that since both a linear and a squared term of the union density are included, the effect of (lagged) union density on the net investment rate is given by 2 UDENS μ σ + . In other words, the impact depends on the point of the density distribution at which the effect is evaluated. Notes: All three models were estimated with time fixed effects, while the FE model was estimated with province fixed effects in addition to time fixed effects. * Indicates significance at the 95% level; ** Indicates significance at the 99% level.
Unlike the other two models, in the net investment regressions none of the results are significant at the 5 percent level, although some of the coefficients are nearly significant at 10 percent. The coefficient on lagged union density in the pooled OLS model is -0.19 and the coefficient on lagged union density squared is 0.22, implying that, at the 25 th percentile of union density (i.e., 0.31), the impact on the net investment rate of increasing union density by one unit is -0.054 (i.e., -0.19 + 2 x 0.22 x 0.31). At the median of union density (i.e., 0.34), the impact on the net investment rate is -0.04 and at the 75 th percentile of union density (i.e., 0.38), it is -0.02. The impact of lagged union density becomes positive only at a union density of 0.43, which is roughly the 90 th percentile of the distribution of density in the Canadian data set. However, as noted, none of these effects are statistically different from zero.
Because these results are not statistically significant, I do not estimate their implications for the US.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have evaluated the arguments presented for passing EFCA and considered the likely unintended consequences it will generate, should it be passed. My primary analysis constituted a quantitative assessment of the link between union density and unemployment.
Proponents of EFCA argue that the Act will reverse the downward trend in union membership and thus bolster worker wages and overall social welfare. While I concur that union membership is likely to increase, especially as a result of a switch to card checks from the current system of secret ballot elections, I find that EFCA is unlikely to achieve its primary goal of improving overall social welfare. Any potential increase in some union-represented employee wages and benefits would be offset by other likely effects, including a reduction in jobs overall and an increase in the unemployment rate.
These latter two impacts affect the economy as a whole and thus would overwhelm any anticipated wage and benefit increases among the subset of workers that gain union status. The following table summarizes the potential effects that my empirical analysis of Canadian data predicts EFCA could have on the US unemployment and employment rates. Notes: 1) Predicted increases in unemployment computed using regression coefficients of 0.297-0.353 (see Table 3 ) 2) Predicted decreases in employment to population ratios computed using coefficients of -0.172 to -0.227 (see Table 4 ). Explanations of computations are provided in the Appendix.
3) All relevant statistics are from the U.S. lnuerate The natural log of uerate as described above.
emp_pop Ratio of provincial employment to provincial population from 1976 to 1997.
nrmlnetinv Normalized net investment as defined in Odgers and Betts (1997) as ( udensity Union density measured as the percentage of the provincial labor force that is unionized. This data was available from 1976 to 1995. Data for 1996 and 1997 was generated by linearly extrapolating the original data.
udensity_sq The square of (udensity/100).
output_fd The first difference of provincial output. Provincial GDP or output from 1981 to 1997 was measured in chained 2002 Canadian dollars.
cpi_rate The rate of increase in the provincial consumer price index. Provincial CPI was available from 1979 to 1997 (2002 = 100).
output_pop The ratio of provincial GDP to provincial population from 1981 to 1997.
output_pop_fd The first difference of output_pop as defined above.
output_fd_stock The first difference of provincial output or output_fd divided by the provincial net capital stock log_output The natural log of output as described above. 2) Variation of labor legislation across Canadian provinces 3) Results of empirical estimation for all models and specifications The table above summarizes the predicted effects for EFCA obtained by applying the results of the regression analysis presented in Tables 3 and 5 of the appendix.
The first column in Table 8 presents two hypothetical union densities 10% and 5% above the 2007 union density respectively. These levels have been chosen on the basis of predictions made in other studies on the degree to which union density may rise in the United States as a consequence of the passage of EFCA.
The second column is the difference between 2007 union density and the potential union density.
On the basis of the analysis in Table 3 of the appendix, the relationship between lagged union density and current unemployment rate is estimated to be such that if there is a 1 percentage point increase in lagged union density, we would expect to see an increase in the unemployment rate of 0.297 to 0.353 percentage points.
By multiplying the hypothetical increases in lagged union density reported in the second column (measured in percentage points) with the estimated effect on unemployment rates of 0.297 -0.353 we obtain predicted levels of unemployment. These are reported in the third column.
The absolute effect of an unemployment rate of u% unemployment in terms of jobs is the size of the labor force multiplied with u/100. The BLS estimates of the labor force in Jan 2009 were 153,716,000. Multiplying this labor force by the estimated unemployment rate gives us the number of jobless workers. These figures are reported in the fourth column.
On the basis of the analysis in Table 5 of the appendix, the relationship between lagged union density and the employment to population ratio is estimated to be such that if there is a 1 percentage point increase in lagged union density, we would expect to see a reduction in the employment to population ratio of 0.172 to 0.227 percentage points.
By multiplying the hypothetical increases in lagged union density that are reported in the second column (measured in percentage points) with the estimated effect on employment One estimate of the increased rate of unionization due to EFCA has been offered by Andy Stern, the president of SEIU (Service Employees International Union), is that the passage of EFCA will increase union membership by 1.5 million members per year for the next 10-15 years Using Stern's estimate as given, we can combine our prior results to compute the cumulative effect of increased union density on both unemployment rates and unemployment levels over a ten year horizon using data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The growth rate in the labor force is predicted to be 0. 
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The level of unionized employment in 2008 was 16.1 million, thus as per Stern's prediction, it will rise by 1.5 million each year. In 2019, therefore, unionized employment will stand at 30.1 million.
Union density, as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is the percentage of the workforce that received wages or salaries that belongs to a union. If we assume that the number of wage and salaried workers in the economy grows at the same rate as the labor force as a whole, we may express the wage and salary work force as Overall, the cumulative effect of 1.5 million additional union members per year for 10 years will increase unemployment between 5.3 and 6.2 million with union density settling at just under 23%. Assuming all other factors as constant, the effect of this increase in union membership will push the unemployment rate up to between 8.6 and 9.2%. 
